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COMMENTS
HABEAS CORPUS AND THE MILITARY: THE CRIPPLED
ATTACK ON COURT-MARTIALS
A few months after Washington's inauguration, our army num-
bered a mere 672 of the 840 authorized by Congress. Today, in
dramatic contrast, the situation is this: Our armed forces number
two and a half million; every resident male is a potential member
of the peacetime armed forces; such service may occupy a minimum
of four per cent of the adult life of the average American male
reaching draft age; reserve obligations extend over ten per cent of
such a person's life; and veterans are numbered in excess of twenty-
two and a half million. When the authority of the military has such
a sweeping capacity for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the
wisdom of treating the military establishment as an enclave
beyond the reach of civilian courts almost inevitably is drawn
into question.'
At the time of this writing the Viet Nam war is no longer a potent
political issue. The mass public protests against the war have lost the
energy that caused them to dominate headlines in the late sixties.
Much debate about the war centered on its constitutionality,2 but the
Supreme Court was insulated from deciding this politically intense
issue.3 That a great many lives have been affected by the constitu-
tionally unchallenged war is obvious. Even as American involvement
is phased down, it is equally obvious that a great many lives are yet
to be affected by the war and the military establishment in general.
For those still serving in the military and for those yet to serve, other
constitutional issues of great importance persist: the rights to be
afforded the servicemen, how these rights are to be protected, and
what tribunal will have the ultimate word in 'defining and upholding
these rights.
The American public, an aggregate of citizen-consumers of Amer-
ican law, has traditionally looked to the Supreme Court as the ultimate
exegete and protector of rights derived from the Constitution. Under
now familiar principles, it is axiomatic that our constitutional rights
are what the Supreme Court interprets these rights to be. With the
1 Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187-88
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Warren].2 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). See also G. GuN-
TrEa & N. DOWLiNG, CASES AND MATmrS ON CONSTU-troNAL LAW 599-610
(8th ed. 1970); Velvel, The War in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and
Jurisdictionally'Attackable, 16 KAN. L. R-v. 449 (1968).
3 The constitutionality of the war has not been a "justiciable" issue. See Velvel
v. Nixon, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968);
Hart v. United States, 391 U.S. 956 (1968); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934
(1967).
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Court's recognition that servicemen do not lose their constitutional
rights just because they have donned uniforms,4 it is natural to assume
that the Court is continuing to define and protect the soldiers' rights.
Such is not the case.
At least superficially, the reasons for this phenomenon are simple.
Congress is partly responsible; it has refused to provide for direct
review of military courts by civilian courts. 5 Thus, servicemen who
claim that military courts have convicted them in violation of their
constitutional rights must resort to collateral attack. Habeas corpus,
the "great writ of liberty," is the recognized means for vindicating
constitutional rights in a collateral proceeding; 6 yet the Supreme
Court, and the lower federal courts which operate under its guidance,
have almost closed the door. More precisely, the courts have nar-
nowly restricted the review of constitutional due process claims raised
by servicemen in habeas litigation. As a result, military due process
is not subject to Supreme Court standards, and servicemen are denied
the full protection of their constitutional rights.7 By focusing in more
4 Burns v. Wilson, 846 U.S. 137, 142 (1953). The Court of Military Appeals
has said that 'itihe impact of Burns is an unequivocal holding by the Supreme
Court that the protections of the Constitution are available to servicemen . . f
United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.M.C.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249, 254 (1967). See also
Warren, supra note 1, at 188.
5 The "finality clause," UNiFoRm CoDE oF MxArAny JusncE, 10 U.S.C. § 876
(1970) is usually cited as authority. See, e.g., Bums v. Wilson, 846 U.S. 187, 142
(1953).
In a pre-Civil War case, Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82-83
(1858), the Court first enunciated the doctrine that civil courts could not directly
review military court decisions. This decision rested on the fact that military
courts were established under Congress' power "telo make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval forces . . . U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
The fact that military judges do not have life tenure has traditionally been a clear
indication that military courts are legislative courts" and not "constitutional
courts" under article III. A curious situation arose in 1963 when the House of
Representatives passed a bill, H.R. No. 3179, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), which
would have given judges on the Court of Military Appeals life tenure. Whether
life tenure judges would have made military decisions directly reviewable by
article III courts was never decided-the bill failed in the Senate.
For a recent decision holding that United States Courts of Appeals have no
jurisdiction to review decisions of the United States Court of Military A ppeals, see
Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496, 497 (1st Cir. 1968). See generally, Ghent,
Military Appellate Processes, 10 Am. Cumm. L. BEv. 125 (1971).
G Other forms of collateral relief are available to servicemen challenging con-
victions. Mandamus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 136 (1970) to correct military
records. See, e.g., Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969); Lima v.
Secretary of the United States Army, 314 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Also,
servicemen may sue for back pay in the Court of Claims (to establish their
case they would have to show they were wrongly convicted), see e.g., Shaw v.
United States, 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Perhaps because the law of these
alternative means of collateral relief is uncertain, habeas corpus is the relief pre-
dominately sought, see Burris & Jones, Civilian Courts and Courts-Martial-The
Civilian Attorney's Perspective, 10 Am. CnMm. L. BEv. 139, 153-56 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Burris & Jones].
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depth on the presently restricted scope of habeas corpus review of
court-martials, this comment will attempt to trace the history, doctrines,
and decisions that have shaped the law in this area. In the process,
it is hoped that the need to broaden the scope of military habeas review
will become apparent.
The writ of habeas corpus has its origins in the common law. The
common law courts used the writ to expand and protect their power
at the expense of other judicial bodies.8 If other than common law
courts imprisoned a citizen, the writ challenged the legal power of the
sentencing tribunal to impose the confinement. 9 In a strict sense, the
use of the writ was limited to questions of competency; if a common
law court determined that a citizen had been confined by a tribunal
which lacked jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter, or
lacked the power to impose the sentence, the court issued the writ
and release from confinement resulted.10
As part of the common law, the writ was considered to be the
heritage of every Englishman." The Founding Fathers recognized
the writ by mentioning it in the Constitution.1 2 By implication, the
Supreme Court could have treated its power to issue the writ as a
matter of constitutional authorization;' 3 however, an early opinion
of the Court indicated that jurisdiction to issue the writ required
statutory authorization.14 Congress granted this authorization in the
Judiciary Act of 1789,15 and the Court subsequently held that the
purposes for which the writ could be used were controlled by the
common law.1 Thus, federal habeas courts followed the English
tradition of reviewing only jurisdictional issues.
Curiously, Congress did not give federal courts the power to use
7 For example the bare promise that servicemen have a right to counsel, see
10 U.S.C. § 838 (1970), does not give servicemen their constitutional right to
counsel, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, because the Supreme Court "gloss" is not the
required standard (problems of incorporation encountered under the fourteenth
amendment are not, or should not, be present vis-a-vis military law).
8 Note, Developments-Federal Habeas Corpus 83 HAny. L. REv. 1038, 1040-
45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Federal Habeas Corpus].
9 Id.
10 id.
11 Snedeker, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Prisoners, 6 VAND. L. RPv. 288
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Snedeker].
12 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9 states: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
safety may require it.
'3 See Wurfel, Military Habeas Corpus, 49 MIcH. L. RE . 493, 508 (1951)
in which the author states that the Founding Fathers simply assumed the
existence of the writ.
'4Exp arte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
35 1 Stat. 81 (1789).
1OEx parte Watins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 370 (1830).
19721
KENTUC LAW JouRNAL[V
the writ to release state prisoners.17 Conversely, a majority of state
courts following the common law employed the writ to release prisoners
held in federal custody.' Federal judges objected to state inter-
ference,' 9 and in 1858 the Supreme Court ruled that no state judge
or court had the right to interfere with federal prisoners.20 Shortly
thereafter, Congress gave federal courts jurisdiction to entertain habeas
petitions from state prisoners.21 At this juncture, the common law
principles of the writ were particularly adaptable to the problems of
federalism encountered when federal habeas courts received state
prisoners' petitions. Under the constitutional scheme, principles of
comity precluded federal judges from reviewing issues of state law.
Moreover, state courts shared the responsibility for enforcing the
Constitution and federal law. By limiting the scope of state habeas
review to issues of jurisdiction, a great deal of conflict was avoided.
22
Ex parte Reed23 was the first court-martial case to reach the Su-
preme Court by review of habeas corpus. In previous decisions regard-
ing military law, the Court had established that Congress was acting
within its powers to create military courts,24 that civil courts had no
power to directly interfere with court-martial decisions, 25 and that
the Court could not review military decisions by certiorari. 2 Reed
firmly established that court-martial convictions were subject to habeas
review; since it was a case of first impression, the Court defined the
scope of issues cognizable. Not surprisingly, habeas review was limited
to jurisdictional issues.27 Since habeas petitions from state prisoners
and federal prisoners were similarly limited to review of jurisdictional
issues, there was an unusual harmony in the law.
The stability in the area of habeas review was short-lived, however,
as the Court soon embarked on a long line of decisions that broadened
17 Federal courts could issue the writ for prisoners held "in custody under or
by colour of the authority of the United States." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
§ 14.
is Snedeker, supra note 11, at 289.
19 Id. at 289-90.
2 o Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
2114 Stat. 385 (1867), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
22 See, e.g., Ex parte Royall 117 U.S. 254 (1886).
23 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
24 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858). See note 5 supra, and
accompaning text.
25 Id.
26 Ex parte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
27 The Court stated that courts-martial "are surrounded by the same con-
siderations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tribunals."
Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879). Civilian courts could inquire whether the
court-martial had jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter and had
the power to impose the sentence. Developments-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra
note 8, at 1209.
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the concept of jurisdiction as it defined the issues reviewable in civil
habeas review.28 In succession, the Court affirmed writs issued on
claims of double jeopardy, 29 unconstitutional statutes,30 lack of grand
jury indictment, 1 fundamental unfairness in a mob-dominated trial,
32
and denial of counsel. 33 In all of these cases, the Court clung to the
jurisdiction rubric,34 an approach which tended to obscure the circular
syllogism being used-no jurisdiction, no due process; no due process,
no jurisdiction. The Court finally abandoned the confusing jurisdiction
rationale in Waley v. Johnson35 which held that federal habeas courts
could issue the writ in cases where "the conviction has been obtained
in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused."36
The landmark case of Brown v. Allen37 was the final major expan-
sion in the scope of federal habeas review.3 8 The Court held that all
constitutional claims were subject to de novo review in habeas courts
and state determinations of constitutional claims could be relitigated.
This decision rested primarily on the belief that a collateral federal
court, not preoccupied with finding guilt or innocence, was the best
institutional setting for vindicating constitutional rights.39 Thus, while
28 An a priori explanation of the rationale and methodology used by the Court
mav illuminate the decisions. As a basic premise, confinement by a tribunal which
lack competency to impose the confinement is a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law; therefore, the tribunal's sentence is void. The next logical
progression is to reason that other errors depriving a defendant of liberty without
due process also make a conviction void. Confusion arises when voidness is
equated with lack of jurisdiction, which the Court, quite confusingly, chose to do.
A guess can be made as to why the Court took this approach. After the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment, the Court moved quite slowly in developing the
concept of due process as it applied to the states, see e.g., Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 86 (1873). Without having to break new ground in the due
process area, the judicial conscience could be eased by resorting to the familiar
habeas corpus means to void blatantly unfair state convictions. The only limitation
on the use of habeas corpus was the jurisdictional standard of review, so perhaps
the Court felt justified in corrupting the meaning of jurisdiction.
29Ex Varte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
3OEx parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
31 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
32Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). But see Frank v. Mangrum, 237
U.S. 304 (1915).
33 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
34 See note 28, supra, and accompanying text.
35 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
36 Id. at 104-05.
37344 U.S. 443 (1953).
38 While Brown held that federal courts could relitigate state constitutional
decisions, it had the anamolous effect of barring federal review if state courts had
reached no decision on constitutional challenges. The anamoly was the result of
the Court's interpretation of the exhaustion requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1970). A later case, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), held that federal habeas
rulings were possible even if petitioners had not raised constitutional challenges in
state courts. Thus, in the strictest sense, Brown was not the final step in the ex-
pansion of habeas review.
30 See Developments-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 8, at 1056-62.
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once limited to determining if a civil court had competency, habeas
courts could review constitutional issues on the merits, and Supreme
Court standards were applied and enforced.
Compared to the progressive evolution of civil habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court's development of military habeas corpus has been
intransigent. By World War II, expansion of the scope of review in
civil cases suggested that military prisoners might press constitutional
claims in federal habeas courts. The unprecedented size of military
forces during the war naturally resulted in a dramatic increase in the
number of courts-martial.40 Encouraged by the habeas developments
in civil cases, military prisoners took to the federal courts by "squads
and platoons."41 Habeas petitions were favorably received by federal
judges, 42 and the courts of appeals in six circuits ruled that habeas
courts should expand the scope of review to determine if military
prisoners' rights to fair trial and due process of law were violated.43
Civilian precedents were invoked and military convictions were
vulnerable if violations of constitutional rights were alleged.44
The propriety of the expanded scope of military habeas review was
squarely reached by the Supreme Court in Hiatt v. Brown.45 The Fifth
Circuit had affirmed a district court's issuance of the writ on grounds
that the petitioner's court-martial was improperly constituted and that
certain errors deprived him of due process of law under the fifth
amendment.46 The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
We think the court was in error in extending its review, for the
purpose of determining compliance with the due process clause, to
such matters as the proposition of law set forth in the staff judge
advocate's report, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
respondent's conviction, the adequacy of the pretrial investigation,
and the competency of the law member and defense counsel '...
The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. . . .' The correction of
any errors it [the court-martial] may have committed is for the
military authorities which are alone authorized to review its de-
cision.47
40 Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-
Martial Convictions, 61 CoLum. L. Bv. 40, 45 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Bishop].
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See Katz & Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas Corpus,
27 O.S.L.J. 193, 200 n.39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Katz & Nelson] for repre-
sentative cases from the six circuits.44 Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE LJ. 880, 383-84 (1967).
45339 U.S. 103 (1950).46 Brown v. Hiatt, 175 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949).
47 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1950).
[Vol. 61
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The Court made no reference to the landmark civil decisions; instead,
it reached back to In re Grimley4 s for precedent. Except for the some-
what ambiguous reference to the due process clause,49 Hiatt was a
reversion to the Ex parte Reed standard of review.50
Hiatt was immediately followed by Whelchel v. McDonald51 in
which the Court intimated in dictum, without distinguishing Hiatt,
that a denial of the opportunity to present a defense of insanity might
raise a jurisdictional question.52 Exactly why the Court relapsed into
the use of the jurisdiction rubric is unclear, but the due process
implication was unmistakable.5 3
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Burns v. Wilson
5 4
which still stands as the leading case in defining the scope of habeas
review of courts-martial. The petitioners in Burns alleged that their
convictions had been obtained after several constitutional errors:
admission into evidence of coerced confessions, lack of effective
counsel, suppression of favorable evidence, perjured testimony, and
trial in an atmosphere of vengeance. Following Hiatt, the lower courts
had denied the petition. Four opinions were written in Burns, and
while the dismissal of the petition was affirmed, none of the opinions
attracted a majority.
Justices Reed, Clark, and Burton joined in the opinion of Chief
Justice Vinson. This opinion stated that the scope of habeas review
of the military had always been narrower than the scope of review in
civil cases, that Congress had just adopted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, that the new code provided a system of review the
decisions of which were to be final and binding on all courts, that the
rights of servicemen were conditioned to demands of discipline and
48137 U.S. 147 (1890).
49It is interesting that the Court reviewed the merits of the allegation that the
court-martial was convened in violation of the governing statutes (the Court
cited 62 Stat. 628-29 regarding the composition of courts-martial). Examination
of an early case, McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902), reveals that the
Court voided a conviction, using the jurisdiction concept (see note 28 supra, and
accompanying text), by reasoning that a court-martial convened in violation of the
Articles of War createda jurisdictional defect. Thus, it would seem that due process
issues would be raised by statutory violations. Coupled with the curious negative
pregnant in the Hiatt text mentioning the due process clause, it appeared that at
least some due process issues might be subject to review on the merits.
GO See note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
51340 U.S. 122 (1950).
52 Id. at 124.
53 See note 28 supra, and accompanying text.
5 4 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), Vinson opinion at 137-46 (Burton,
Clark & Reed, if., concurring), Minton opinion at 146-48 (separate opinion),
Frankfurter opinion at 148-50 (dissenting), Douglas opinion at 150-55 (dis-
sentmng, Black, J., concurring) (Jackson, J., affirming without opinion). With the
exception of direct quotations, further citations to the Burns text will be omnitted.
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duty, and that civil courts were not the proper forums to balance the
needs of the military. Having made these arguments, the Chief
Justice enunciated guidelines for habeas review as follows:
[W]hen a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an
allegation raised in that application, it is not open to a federal
civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence....
Had the military courts manifestly refused to consider those
claims, the district court was empowered to review them de
novo ....
These records make it plain that the military courts have heard
the petitioner out on every significant allegation which they urge.
Accordingly, it is not the duty of the civil courts simply to repeat
that process. . . . It is the limited function of the civil courts to
determine whether the military have given fair consideration to
each of these claims .... 55
Justice Jackson concurred in the result without opinion, and Justice
Minton concurred in a separate opinion in which he echoed the prin-
ciples of Hiatt and In re Grimley.
Justice Frankfurter dissented and labeled incorrect the argument
that military habeas review had traditionally been narrower than civil
habeas review. Also, he could not agree that the scope of inquiry
should be limited to questions of jurisdiction or to ascertaining whether
the military had considered constitutional challenges.
Justice Douglas also dissented, Justice Black concurring, on the
grounds that habeas courts should make separate determinations of
constitutional questions based on the standards of due process formu-
lated by the Court. Thus, he advocated having the scope of military
habeas review parallel civil habeas review.
At best, Burns has provided a fragile framework for the lower courts
faced with petitions from military prisoners.56 Although Burns indi-
cated that the narrow standard announced in Hiatt was no longer
appropriate, the new scope of review was, and has been, uncertain.
Forced to struggle with four differing opinions, the lower courts have
generally taken the plurality opinion as the opinion of the Court.
57
The Vinson opinion failed, however, to elaborate on the meaning of
55 346 U.S. 137, 142-44 (1953).
56 Professor Bishop observed that Burns "still stands as the principle lighthouse
in these tackless waters, however low its candlepower." Bishop, supra note 40, at
51.
57 one writer has suggested that Burns has no precedental value because of its
failure to gain a majority of support. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights:
The Original Practice, 72 HAzv. L. 1EBv. 266, 297 (1958).
[Vol. 61
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"full and fair consideration," and subsequent interpretations by the
lower courts have been clearly inconsistent.
The lower court opinions following Burns do not lend themselves
to facile taxonomy.5 8 The predominant interpretation, no doubt in-
fluenced by the "manifestly refused" language in Burns, has been that
habeas courts must only determine if the military courts have given
petitioners' constitutional claims complete and impartial considera-
tion.5 9 If this has been done, habeas courts must refuse to decide the
correctness of the military decisions. The Tenth Circuit, which reviews
petitions from prisoners at the United States Disciplinary Barracks
and the Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas,60 has stated:
"as we understand the Burns decision, it does no more than hold that
a military court must consider questions relating to the guarantees
afforded an accused by the Constitution and when this is done, the
civil courts will not review its action...."61 Also representative of this
interpretation is the recent holding in King v. Moseley62 to the effect
that:
[T]he Court enunciated the rule that the limited function of the
civil courts in reviewing a military conviction on a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, in addition to the jurisdictional issue under
the prior rule, is to determine whether the military gave fair con-
sideration to each of the petitioner's constitutional claims....
The appellant asserts that the military courts and boards
reached the wrong result. But again . . . this is not for us to
evaluate.63
The net effect of this interpretation is that Burns only minutely
expanded the scope of review. If a petitioner fails to raise a due
process objection during the military proceedings, it cannot be said
that the military courts "manifestly refused" to consider his claim.
5s For various attempts at analyzing the lower courts opinions since Burns, see
Bishop, supra note 40, at 60-70; Burris & Jones, supra note 6, at 145-49; Katz &
Nelson, supra note 43, at 206-11; Comment, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 124, 125, 127-29.
GO See, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 435 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 405 U.S. 34 (1972); Thompson v. Parker, 399 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1968);
Palomera v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Heritage, 323 F.2d
731 (5th Cir. 1963); Sunday v. Madigan, 301 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1962); Reed v.
Franke, 297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961); Crigler v. United States Army, 285 F.2d 260
(10th Cir. 1961).
00 Because of the exhaustion requirement (see note 38 supra, and accom-
panyng text), most convicted servicemen are in prison by the time habeas pro-
ceedings are commenced. Since habeas petitioners are required to seek relief in
district courts for the jurisdiction in which they are confined, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over a large portion of military cases.61 Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 487 (1oth Cir. 1953).
62 430 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1970).
O3Id. at 734-35.
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Furthermore, manifest refusal to hear an objection is unlikely. It has
been observed by one critic that a habeas court following Burns may
simply and summarily dismiss a petition on the grounds that the
military did not refuse to hear the allegation, or it may, with equal
ease and on the same authority, stress the requirement that the con-
sideration was full and fair.64
A second approach to interpreting Burns can be roughly categorized
as placing a more qualitative emphasis on the meaning of fair con-
sideration. Instead of making perfunctory kowtows to military de-
cisions because the records indicate that constitutional claims were
considered, some courts have timidly decided to "briefly" review the
claims on the merits to see if the decisions were fair. 5 Fairness in
these cases has not been required to conform with Supreme Court
standards. In cases where the alleged constitutional violations have
been so unfair as to "shock the conscience," some courts have felt
compelled to a review the claims on the merits. 6 In somewhat con-
fusing opinions, other courts have also tried to distinguish between
issues of fact and issues of law, the implication being that legal issues
may require qualitative review.67 The only real consistency running
through all of these cases is the monotonous regularity with which
petitions are denied.
Only two cases have been reported in which bona fide attempts
have been made to broaden the scope of military review to equal
that of civil review. Granting the petition in Application of Stapley,6 s
a Utah district court said in dictum:
[T]he vindication of constitutional rights through such inquiry
and rulings [habeas proceedings] in proper cases transcends ordi-
nary limitations and affords federal courts both the jurisdiction
and the duty to inquire and rule upon the legality of detainment
of any person entitled to constitutional protection whether in or
out of military service. 69
In a second case, Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force,70 the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals unequivocably faced
the issue of the proper scope of habeas review of court-martial con-
64 Bisbop, supra note 40, at 59.
65 See, e.g., Allen v. Van Cantfort, 436 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1971); Harris v.
Ciccone, 417 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1969); Heilman v. United States, 406 F.2d 1011
(7th Cir. 1969).66 See, e.g., Swisher v. United States, 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966); Ashe v.
McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
67 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Blackwell, 354 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1965); Fischer v.
Ruffner, 277 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1960).
6s 246 F.Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
69 Id. at 320.
70415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Comment, 19 Am. U.L. RBv. 84
(1970).
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victions. Recalling Justice Frankfurter's distraught observation in
Burns that convictions by civil courts which lacked due process were
open to habeas attack while identically defective convictions by
military courts were invulnerable, the court refused to accept the
government's argument to confine the scope of review to whether
the military had jurisdiction and whether the military courts had con-
sidered petitioner's constitutional claims. The court did not interpret
Burns as applying standards of review for military convictions that
differed from review of civil convictions. The Circuit Court held:
[T]he test of fairness requires that military rulings on constitutional
issues conform to Supreme Court standards, unless it is shown that
conditions peculiar to military life require a different rule.... The
wholesale exclusion of constitutional errors from civilian review
and the perfunctory review of servicemen's remaining claim's
.*. are limitations with no rational relation to the military circum-
stances which may qualify constitutional requirements. The bene-
fits of collateral review. . . are lost if civilian courts apply a vague
and watered-down standard of full and fair consideration .... 71
The Kauffman court obviously found it difficult to rationalize a
dichotomous approach to habeas review of military convictions and
civil convictions. That other courts have not found a similar difficulty
is most likely due to uncritical acceptance of the arguments made in
the plurality opinion in Burns. The "full and fair consideration" test
is not, however, a rigid mandate for narrow review. It is a conceptual
guideline that should be interpreted according to the times and
atmosphere in which it must operate. Since the Burns arguments
have apparently controlled the meaning of "full and fair considera-
tion," those arguments will be examined for their validity and present
persuasiveness. This is particularly appropriate since the Supreme
Court has said that "habeas corpus is not a static, narrow, formalistic
remedy."7
2
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissent in Burns, the
statement that habeas review of the military has always been more
restricted than habeas review of civil courts is simply not accurate.
Until the Court decided Hiatt, the range of issues cognizable in
military habeas proceedings were paralleled by those in civil habeas
proceedings. During the nineteenth century, there was no dichotomy
because both civil and military review were equally restricted to
jurisdictional issues. As the Court gradually expanded the concept
of jurisdiction in civil cases, a paucity of decisions regarding military
review left the area rather undeveloped until the World War II flood
7 1 Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (1969).
72 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
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of cases. As previously pointed out, lower federal courts simply
assumed the expansion in habeas review applied to military cases.
No dichotomy really existed until Hiatt, and as a "tradition," the
dichotomy observed the veneration of a three year existence.
The plurality opinion of Burns also noted that Congress had just
passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice 73 [hereinafter cited as
UCMJ] in which a substantial number of Bill of Bights guarantees
were secured for the servicemen. 74 This reference was obviously made
to point out that the military was Congress' responsibility, and that
Congress had just exercised its judgement75 If the reference to the
UCMJ was simply a tactful nod to Congress, then it was of little
importance; but taken in its textual setting, the reference clearly
carried the meaning that Congress, through the new code, was guar-
anteeing constitutional due process to servicemen.76 If servicemen's
rights were exclusively left to congressional and executive judgment,
then the Court could not exercise any supervisory function over those
rights; but the opinion also stated that "the constitutional guarantee
of due process is meaningful enough... to protect soldiers as well as
civilians. . . ."7 The fact that Congress adopts legislation does not
reduce the duty of constitutional courts to define and protect con-
stitutional rights; yet the import of Burns is that abdication to Article
I military court judgements on constitutional issues is proper. This is
particularly distressing since the Court has recently stated that "courts-
martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice
subtleties of constitutional law."78
The plurality argument that "[tihe rights of men in the armed
forces must perforce be conditioned to meet overriding demands of
discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which
must determine the precise balance to be struck"79 is not persuasive
for a number of reasons. Central to military discipline is rigid com-
mand control. Broad discretion is given to enforce discipline and
73 Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 [codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940
(1970)].
74 See generally Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused, 51 Mm. L.
R v. 1 (1971).
75 For recent history of congressional administration of military law see
Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law, 10 Am. Cmni. L.
REv. 25, 25-27 (1971).76 See note 7 supra, and accompanying text. The problem with the Burns
decision is brought more clearly into focus when it is realized that the military
courts determine their own "gloss"-Congress does not develop military law on a
case by case basis.
773 46 U.S. 137, 142-44 (1953). See also note 4 supra, and accompanying text.7 8 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
79 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
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the arbitrariness of command power is limited only by the integrity
and fairness of conscience.80 It is difficult to reconcile discretionary,
and potentially arbitrary, power to discipline with procedural justice.
Constitutional due process rights, guarantees of protection from
arbitrariness and unfairness in criminal litigation, are undermined
by the premise that discipline is a proper goal in courts-martial.
Soldiers' rights in a judicial forum should not be conditioned by the
need to discipline.
The argument that civil judges cannot appreciate the needs of
the military in determining constitutional issues is untenable. It is as
easy to say that military courts cannot appreciate the demands of
constitutional rights as it is to say that civil courts cannot appreciate
the demands of discipline and duty. Obviously some balance must be
struck, but leaving that determination to the exclusive judgment of
the military is not a satisfactory approach. If habeas courts can weigh
special state interests in hearing petitions from state convictions, so
should they be able to weigh military interests on petitions from
military convictions."' The approach taken in Kauffman 2 is much
more satisfactory than the apparent Burns approach. Furthermore,
the policy underlying the decision in Brown v. Allen applies with
equal force to opening habeas review of military convictions.88
The institutional setting of courts-martial makes it likely that con-
stitutional rights might be overlooked or ignored. The mere possi-
bility of constitutional violations requires that an impartial forum
adjudicating only constitutional claims be provided.
The finality clause of the UCMJ referred to in Burns was not meant
to preclude all civil review of the military.8 4 The legislative history
of that clause explicitly states that Congress did not intend to exempt
habeas corpus review.8 5 The fact that Congress has not provided for
direct review should require that the issues cognizable on collateral
review be broad enough to allow full determinations of fundamental
constitutional claims. Furthermore, a recent addition to the UCMJ
directing military courts to apply principles of law recognized in
80 See, The Dilemma of Military Discipline and Procedural Justice, 17 A.B.A.
STUD. L w J. 12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Dilemma of Military Discipline
and Procedural Justice].
81 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963).
82 The military must carry the burden of showing why military needs require
modifications of Supreme Court standards. See text at note 71 supra.
83 See text at note 39 supra.
8
4 See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
85 H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1949).
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criminal cases tried in federal district courts,86 implies a need for
broadened habeas review-particularly if constitutional violations are
claimed.
While examination of Burns and its effect on the lower courts does
not present an exhaustive survey of reasons for broadening the scope
of military habeas review, it should at least be clear that servicemen
are being denied an effective means of vindicating their constitutional
rights. The Supreme Court, however, has refused to reconsider or
clarify the "ful and fair consideration" standard in spite of the general
confusion in the lower courts and the tenuous arguments made in
Burns. Nevertheless, the Court recently handed down an opinion deal-
ing with military law that clearly showed the Court's concern for
servicemen's rights. In O'Callahan v. Parker,87 the Court made a flank-
ing attack on military jurisdiction by holding that servicemen could
only be tried for "service-connected crimes in military courts. The clear
intention of the Court was to protect servicemen's due process rights
by having soldiers tried in civil courts for crimes having no relation
to the military's mission. Thus, the scope of issues cognizable in
habeas courts now includes whether a soldier's conviction is based on
a service-connected crime. If the courts find that the military has
jurisdiction, however, Burns controls and "full and fair consideration"
is still the standard of review for constitutional claims.
No doubt O'Callahan was a response to the rapidly accelerating
public criticism of military justice. Young soldiers are themselves
questioning, criticizing, and protesting against regulations, policies,
and orders of the military.88 Congress has focused critical attention
on the system of military justice and voiced concern for the soldiers
who claim the constitutional rights of citizenship.8 9 In response, two
bills have been introduced in Congress that would grant Supreme Court
review of military courts by writ of certiorari.90 If passed, the Court
would find it difficult to avoid issues regarding servicemen's con-
stitutional rights. In the meantime servicemen must hope that "full
and fair consideration" acquires a substantive meaning. It should not
stand as a stumbling block or barrier to constitutional rights.
lames A. Harris
86 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970).
87 895 U.S. 258 (1969). See also Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355
(1971).
88 The Dilemma of Military Discipline and Procedural justice, supra note 80,
at 12.
89 See Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 1971: The Need for Legislative Re-
form, 10 Am. Cnim. L. 11Ev. 9 (1971).
90S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 844 (1971) (sponsored by Senator Birch
Bayli); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 844 (1971) (sponsored by Congressman
Charles Bennett).
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